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Abstract 
The wine industry did not become significant in New Zealand before the 1970s.  The internal 
New Zealand market was small and the focus of the economy was on trade in meat, dairy and 
wool products rather than wine.  Wine production has a long history, but not in New Zealand.  
Wine production has also been a motor for economic growth.  It became prominent after the 
accession of Britain to the EEC in 1973, when traditional agribusiness markets in the UK ceased 
to be available, and alternative agricultural products had to be found and marketed to preserve the 
New Zealand balance of payments. 
 
Different forms of agribusiness have been portrayed as achieving value extraction by taking 
performance gaps, or identifying and seizing opportunity gaps, „blue ocean‟ strategy being one 
example.  That involves the development of a new product for a previously non-existent market.  
Thus there is no business competition because it is new.  The development of [yellow tail] wines 
by Casella Wines of Australia exemplifies this and neatly parallels the development of St Helena 
Wine Estate, which has seized both opportunity and performance gaps, particularly in delivering 
successfully to Tesco, through its subsidiary Cottesbrook, the first New Zealand Sauvignon Blanc 
Bag-in-Box wine supplied to the UK market. 
 
This paper is a case study of the production and marketing successes and travails of a medium 
sized New Zealand winery, which has only existed for thirty years.  It highlights the influence of 
family; the role of export marketing; the nature of the wine supply chain from New Zealand to a 
UK supermarket; the role of channel coordinators in maintaining that; the increasing place of 
developing „new labels‟ in marketing strategy to find new „blue oceans‟; and the ongoing 
turnover of business arrangements for most wine businesses over time.   
 
Introduction 
New Zealand was a comparatively late colony only founded in 1840.  It has always been 
dependent on its primary exports for its economic wellbeing, but it does not have the rich mineral 
endowment bestowed upon Australia.  It is a major producer of agricultural commodities, but 
because its own internal market is so small, only 4 million people (2007), it depends on exporting 
them for its economic growth.  Until Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973 
and the oil shocks of that year, it had been the main market for New Zealand lamb and dairy 
produce.  That market was curtailed overnight, with punitive tariff barriers and quotas.  New 
Zealand farmers were confronted with the need to sell their produce for the first time on the open 
world market, rather than to the imperial motherland.   
 
That had two effects with unexpected consequences some years later for wine production in New 
Zealand.  First, it forced New Zealand producers to become concerned about marketing as a 
discipline and particularly with what their consumers wanted.  Secondly, indirectly through 
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imposing rigorous hygiene standards for New Zealand slaughter works and milk factories to be 
acceptable to export to the EEC, the EEC regime encouraged the development of a vibrant 
stainless steel manufacturing industry in New Zealand.  Thus when the wine industry expanded 
from the late 1970s, it built its tanks from the most hygienic material available, stainless steel.  
Thus the latest processing technology was introduced to the New Zealand wine industry from the 
beginning of its modern expansion. 
 
The wine industry has been hailed as a traditional industry, which has yet been a motor for 
economic growth in many countries (Smith, 2007).  While production is still concentrated in the 
well-established producers of the Old World – France, Italy and Spain, an increasing amount of 
the world wine production is coming from the New World, particularly Australia, but also Chile, 
Argentina, South Africa and New Zealand.  World trade in wine has been increasing too.  The big 
three Old World producers have increased the value of their exports, but their relative shares of 
world trade have fallen.  In contrast some New World producers have increased their shares 
dramatically (Chile, South Africa and Argentina).  By 2004 Australia had overtaken Spain as the 
third largest exporter and the USA and Chile had overtaken Germany and Portugal as fourth and 
fifth biggest exporters respectively (Smith, 2007).  While production in New Zealand has 
increased, it is still only a very small part of the oversupplied world wine trade.  In 1975 exports 
of wine from New Zealand were only worth $NZ 0.1 million for the year ending 30 June (fob), 
but by 2006 they had reached $NZ 510.2 millions (fob) (HortResearch, 2006).  Nevertheless, it is 
forming an increasingly significant part of New Zealand primary sector production and it is 
projected to reach 116 million litres worth $NZ1.2 billion by 2011 by when it should have 
overtaken kiwifruit as the most important horticultural product in terms of export earnings (MAF, 
2007).  Rabobank‟s global industry specialist in wines and spirits recently drew attention to the 
success of New Zealand wine exports which had a “…higher export price point than any other 
New World producers” (See Table 1).  Only France achieved a higher price point boosted by 
sales of champagne (Heijbroek, 2007, p.10).  Wine is thus a significant export product for New 
Zealand, a country with a perennial problem of its overseas trade deficit.   
 
Table 1 Export prices for New World wine producers in 2005 
 
Country Units: $US per litre 
Argentina 1.46 
Chile 2.13 
U.S. 2.17 
South Africa 2.18 
Australia 2.92 
New Zealand 5.75 
(Heijbroek, 2007, p.10) 
 
Zalan (2005) has argued that wine is not a completely globalised commodity because, while it is 
subject to global mergers and international business activity, wine is still differentiated on a 
localised basis, which gives it market distinctiveness.  Most wine producers never contemplate 
exporting their wine.  Localisation is as important in New Zealand as anywhere else in the world. 
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This paper is a longitudinal case study of the first commercial winery in Canterbury, New 
Zealand, St Helena Wine Estate, which was founded in 1978.  Canterbury is south of the main 
wine production area in Marlborough, and enjoys a slightly cooler climate, but it has specific 
terroirs, especially around Waipara, which produce significant Rieslings and Pinot Noirs, the 
equal of anything Marlborough produces (Tipples, 2002a).  St Helena does not enjoy the best 
terroirs of Waipara but still continues in business as a wine producer and exporter, selling much 
of its product on the opposite side of the world in the UK, Europe and the USA.  How this 
business developed and changed to cope with changing production circumstances is reported in 
an attempt to find out what has kept the business afloat in a world oversupplied with wine, when 
many of St Helena‟s supply chains are some of the longest in the world.  The messages conveyed 
by this case study may help other wine producers to cope with market vicissitudes.  The study 
was pushed on by academic curiosity into what had helped this business to keep going. 
 
Agribusiness and the wine sector – the possibility of blue oceans 
The international agribusiness environment has been characterised by falling relative prices, the 
free worldwide movement of capital, the ability to move technology quickly from one area to 
another and increasing global competition.  Ongoing value extraction has depended on not only 
continued innovation and good supply chain management, but also marketing excellence (Gow, 
2006).   That value has been secured usually in one of three ways – by product leadership, by 
operational excellence or by customer intimacy.  Product leadership describes endeavours such as 
research and development or brand promotion.  Operational excellence features optimal 
processes and high efficiency leading to cheap prices and convenience, whereas customer 
intimacy relates to an understanding of customer needs and finding solutions especially suited to 
the individual customer wants.  To be successful companies tend to excel in one of these value 
disciplines (Gow, 2006). Further, value can also be generated by exploiting performance gaps 
and opportunity gaps (Prahalad, 1993, quoted in Gow, Oliver and Gow, 2002).  Performance 
gaps are typically treated by improved production and marketing systems and greater efficiencies 
such as improved supply chain management of agribusiness supply chains.  On the other hand 
opportunity gaps are concerned with seizing chances for growth from new business, new market 
developments, or changes of strategic direction.  „Blue Ocean‟ strategy is an example of this.  
According to Kim and Mauborgne (2005a; 2005b) Casella Wines, the Australian winery which 
developed the very successful [yellow tail] brand of wine, have created a „Blue Ocean‟, which is 
Kim and Mauborgne‟s metaphor for uncontested market space.  It largely frees a producer from 
their competition.  In their opinion, backed with extensive research and a database covering thirty 
industries going back over 100 years: 
“Value innovation is the cornerstone of blue-ocean strategy.  We call it value 
innovation because instead of focusing on beating the competition in existing market 
space, you focus on getting out of existing market boundaries by creating a leap in 
value for your buyers and your company which leaves the competition behind.”  
(Kim and Mauborgne, 2005b, p.22) 
 
By strategic moves Kim and Mauborgne mean “…the set of managerial actions and decisions in 
making a major market-creating business offering” (Ibid., p.23).  Casella wines had made such 
moves described as „Sailing into the blue ocean‟ (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005a).   
 
That is one example of empirical research on an agribusiness chain which has been reported and 
used as a model, but there is a lack of other such case studies (Lindgreen, Hingley and 
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Trienekens, 2006).  Besides, there has been little reported about the extended supply chains 
servicing New Zealand agribusiness, although those supply chains are some of the longest in the 
world and are vital for New Zealand‟s continued economic wellbeing (Patterson, 2005).  While 
there have been some studies of wine agribusiness chains from New Zealand, which are 
discussed below, the problems of managing such chains need to be set in their full context.   
 
Since 2000 some studies in the food and agriculture industries have begun to explore the 
empirical details of relationship marketing, seeking to take advantage of customer intimacy.  In 
such relationship marketing a seller has had to develop a unique offer to meet a specific customer 
need (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2002).  How managers have understood and reacted to relationship 
marketing and how it fitted into the general marketing landscape, especially marketing activities 
for building relationships, was an early focus of Hingley and Lindgreen (2002).  Some of their 
case studies related to New Zealand wine businesses.  The latter expressed concerns not to 
become too dependent on a single market or a big retailer; but on matching with similar sized 
importers of their wines and reaching mutual trading agreements (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2002).  
New Zealand vineyards often required importers to take only their wines of a specific type from 
New Zealand in an exclusive deal.  A relational approach was also facilitated by mutual trust and 
“…a good workable social context‟ (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2002, p. 816).  While some 
winegrowers produced a standard range of wines, others were attempting to customize their 
wines, such as label design for Tesco (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2002, p. 819).  Good inter-
organizational communications were increasingly employed as a strategy, whether through, 
newsletters, their own websites, through meetings between winery and importer at various levels, 
or international press coverage (ibid).   
 
In contrast, Beverland and Lindgreen (2004) looked at the evolving patterns of relationships over 
time among New Zealand wineries, importers, retailers and customers.  Their study of the New 
Zealand wine industry is one of the few which has attempted to track the evolutions of 
relationships in a longitudinal manner.  Further, they advocated replicating their research across a 
broader range of industries over time, by longitudinal case studies of single firms and an 
historical analysis of marketing practice within industries.  This study unintentionally replicates 
their research in some ways with another historical study of marketing and relationships within a 
single firm and supply chain in the New Zealand wine industry.  It was begun and initially 
reported (Tipples, 2006) before Beverland and Lindgreen‟s work was discovered, but provides 
independent validation of it. 
 
Beverland and Lindgreen found evidence supporting the position of Achrol and Etzel (2003) that 
emphasized the value of relationships in growing markets and de-emphasized them in stable 
markets.  In growing markets firms did form relationships focused on short-term problem based 
needs:  
“…in growth markets the need to form relationships may be more paramount due to 
lack of such relationships, whilst in mature markets, firms may place less emphasis 
on relationship goals, as they are searching for new opportunities” (Beverland and 
Lindgreen, 2004, p.852).   
Further they note that firms routinely create, build and leave relationships in reaction to changing 
strategic needs and the business environment (ibid.).  They also found that their evidence 
supported the position of Joshi and Campbell (2003) that firms who establish relationships early 
can achieve substantial adaptation benefits by leveraging their mutual activities to the benefit of 
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both parties.  In terms of managerial implications, they concluded that the strategic form that 
firms take is a response to the complex nature of the context in which they find themselves.  For 
example: 
“…firms often gained significant advantages by forming and/or intensifying their 
relationships early and, assuming continued investment in relationships 
(complemented by constant market contact), these firms could enjoy increasing 
returns and create tacit advantages that would be difficult for competitors to 
surmount”. (Beverland and Lindgreen, 2004, p. 853) 
 
Patterson (2005) has expanded the discourse by looking at the New Zealand meat industry, which 
historically has depended on the same long supply chain to the UK.  As a large and dynamic 
industry, it has had players regularly entering and exiting it.  Such entrepreneurs tend to focus on 
a specific niche rather than compete with large and established companies in the generic or 
commodity market place.  They tailor their product offering to what the market niche, which they 
have identified, demands.  Patterson highlighted the role of channel coordinators in achieving the 
delivery of a consistent product offering tailored to the requirements of the market niche, but 
found that despite its importance there was very little research on the place and performance of 
this particular role.  So he set out to find out how meat industry supply chains were structured; 
why a particular structure was used by a niche chain; and what was the role of the channel 
coordinator in such chains.  In his case studies he found all the supply chains studied had 
different structures, but that the key to their structures was the role played by the channel 
coordinator, who brings all the influencing factors together.  They manage the chains to see that 
the requirements of the target niche market are met and flow through to the consumers.  So the 
product offering was adapted to suit them.  Channel coordinators also controlled „their‟ brand and 
the consistency of the product marketed under it.  In so doing they communicated with most or 
all of the actors in the chain to retain their control and ensure full and regular information flows, 
particularly to head off any problems at their outset, to provide feedback, and for fine tuning the 
product offering.  To motivate other actors in the chain, the channel coordinators used incentives 
to ensure that what was required was done.  Patterson highlights their focus: 
“…the channel coordinator who targets a niche market will focus specifically on a 
market segment, customizing his product to suit the demands of his target niche.  In 
so doing, he differentiates it from competing products and builds an in-depth 
understanding of that market niche.” (Patterson, 2005, p. 170) 
The case studies showed that without the channel coordinators there would have been no chains 
and no „niche blue oceans‟.  They became channel coordinators because they identified a 
potentially profitable market niche and set up the supply chain from nothing to capture that 
(Paterson, 2005, p. 172).  The possibility and value of contrasting supply chains and channel 
coordinators marketing different products (e.g. fruit, vegetables, non agricultural produce) to 
different niche markets was also identified (ibid., p. 174).  The case study which follows was set 
up entirely independently of the research described in the previous paragraphs.  However, it 
provides a lot of further evidence supporting the research described and corroborating much of 
that research.   
 
Methodology 
The story of St Helena Wine Estate‟s business development is based primarily on semi-
structured interviews with Robin Mundy, its owner, and his business colleague, Brent Rawstron, 
owner of Rossendale Winery.  Each was interviewed several times, with subsequent 
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clarifications, where necessary, conducted by telephone and email.  Other personnel and business 
partners were interviewed by telephone.  Interviews were taped and notes and transcripts made 
of these interviews and other meetings which occurred over the period 1998 to 2008.  The case 
study was founded on long term knowledge of the New Zealand and Canterbury wine industries.  
The author is historian of the latter (Tipples, 2002a and b).  A strategy of triangulation was used 
throughout for data testing to give maximum reliability and content validity of the case study.  
Different information sources and methods were cross-checked to give coherent and supported 
results (Denzin, 1978; Hill and Capper, 1999; Sale, 2003).  Multiple sources were used to cope 
with the unreliability of the human memory: previous experiences, observations, research notes, 
interview notes and transcripts, world-wide-web materials, and whatever documents were 
available such as books, and academic and media articles.  Events only mentioned once were 
considered to be a possibility; those mentioned twice a likelihood; and those mentioned three or 
more times a definite probability.  Such a strategy has become for the author a way of 
conducting research dependent on a substantial element of oral history.  The resulting paper has 
been referred back to Robin Mundy and Brent Rawstron to confirm that their views and how 
they frame the problems of wine production and marketing have been captured accurately. Their 
openness and generous assistance is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
St Helena Wine Estate (Canterbury, New Zealand) 
While the first planting of grapes in New Zealand was as early as 1814, before the 1970s there 
had been little thought of wine production in Canterbury, with the exception of some plantings on 
Banks Peninsula.  They had been carried out by a small group of French settlers in 1840.  
However, by the twentieth century these had died out, although they had showed early promise.  
There was no entrepreneurial drive or capital among those early settlers, or government 
incentives, to foster the development of the district (Tipples, 2002a), which was “...splendidly 
suited to the cultivation of the vine” (Bragato, 1895, p.6).  From then until the 1970s only one or 
two small plantings of grapes in Canterbury had been attempted but unsuccessfully (Tipples, 
2002a). 
 
It was not until the early 1970s that serious thought was given to the role cool climate varieties 
might play in grape and wine production in Canterbury. A suggestion was made that Canterbury 
could have microclimates well suited to varieties such as Riesling.  Conventional wisdom was 
that grapes should not be grown in New Zealand‟s South Island, because it was too cold.  In 1973 
twenty grape varieties were planted at Lincoln.  After three years, grapes were harvested and 
found to have sugar-acid levels better than expected and wine was made.  This showed promise 
and the Lincoln vineyard was extended to sixty cultivars (Tipples, 2002a). 
 
Watching from the wings were people interested in the commercial application of these trials.  
Among them were the Mundy brothers, market gardeners of Coutts Island.  Their potato 
production enterprise had been severely affected by potato cyst nematode and they were seeking 
alternative crops.  While visiting Lincoln, looking at blackcurrant production, they noticed 
Lincoln‟s grapes and heard about the wine production trials.  They decided to try grape 
production.  St Helena vineyard was established in 1978, with cuttings of the cool climate 
varieties identified as best suited to the Coutts Island environment.  St Helena became the first 
winery in New Zealand to be financed by a Rural Bank loan and was opened by the Prime 
Minister in 1981.  Robin Mundy has explained: 
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“From 1964 to 1979 my brother Norman and I grew potatoes and other vegetables on 
our property at Coutts Island, but the potato cyst nematode knocked out our operation 
and we had to seek alternative crops.  We contemplated kiwifruit, blueberries, 
peppermint and blackcurrants, then while at Lincoln College looking at blackcurrants, 
we noticed they were growing grapes and making wine.... 
Thanks to the experimental work done by Lincoln we were able to obtain cuttings of 
the varieties best suited to our area.  In 1978 the first 10 acres (4 ha) of grapes were 
planted and by 1981 we were growing 30 acres (12 ha) and approaching the first 
harvest...Danny Schuster, Lincoln‟s winemaker was employed and the winery was 
named St Helena.  The small 1981 vintage sold out in one day!” (Collins, 1991) 
 
In 1983 St Helena won the first South Island gold medal at the national Air New Zealand Wine 
competition for its 1982 Pinot Noir.  A plaque was presented to St Helena to commemorate this 
historic achievement.  It really brought the attention of the country to Canterbury as a wine 
producing area, which led to further major viticultural developments (Tipples, 2007).  After that 
initial success St Helena had no problem selling their wine on the local market, but they had 
problems maintaining supplies to New Zealand customers over a whole year from their limited 
production base.   
 
The role of family 
St Helena had become the wine label for a traditional family farming business, M J Mundy Ltd. 
formed in 1956.  Robin‟s father had a philosophy that they should just be „doing their own 
grapes‟ and not be buying in grapes from other producers.  The brothers did not become directors 
of the company until 1989.  Differences developed between them.  Norman was responsible for 
the viticultural side of the operation and thought all the money should be spent in the vineyard 
and in winemaking.  Robin had taken over the sales side of the business and was frustrated 
because he had no resources to develop the St Helena brand.  In 1988 frost destroyed the grape 
crop, but they still had the other parts of their farming operation, especially the black currants 
they had also diversified into after the nematode problem.   
 
In 1992 Robin obtained a divorce from his first wife.  That necessitated a valuation of the 
company which showed there was not much of value in the business, but a lot of debt for the 
family owned farm.  The payout was comparatively small because of the debt, but the business 
situation was getting worse not better after deduction of the brothers‟ meagre salaries.  Within 3-
4 years their bank would probably sell their farm.  So the farm was put up for sale, but did not 
sell.  At this time there was an on-going rural recession in New Zealand following the removal of 
all farm subsidies in 1984 (Cloke, 1989).  Moreover, it was not a successful business anyway.  
Two years of family discord followed.  By then Robin had a new female partner, who had some 
money, so they decided to buy his brother out.  They had to wait for an ideal opportunity, which 
arose when his brother, who was responsible for frost fighting, chose to go fishing one weekend 
when frost wiped the grapes out again.  Wine stocks were very low and the accountants reckoned 
that something had to happen.  The farm was divided, which was facilitated by the death at that 
time (1994) of their father.  Norman received 4 ha, which had been used by their father for 
growing calla lilies and had been quite profitable, while Robin received the grapes and winery.   
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Cellars of Canterbury and Marlborough 
At that time Robin and his wife started buying in wine from Marlborough and experimenting 
with new labels.  They could see that buying-in grapes was probably their financial solution in 
years when they had a shortfall in production.  Differentiating their wine by selling it under a new 
label was not a problem in New Zealand as there were no regulations equivalent to the French 
AOC „geographical indications‟ legislation tying labels to wines produced from particular land 
areas. Then they were approached and asked to be part of a cooperative winemaking and selling 
company, which became known as Cellars of Canterbury.  Cellars of Canterbury was a 
cooperative company set up to reduce a performance gap in marketing by achieving economies of 
scale and reduced shared marketing expenses between five medium sized Canterbury wineries 
(Giesen Wine Estate, St Helena Wine Estate, Sherwood Estate Wines, Rossendale Winery and 
Sandihurst Wines).  However, to become successful exporters the directors believed they needed 
a supply of Sauvignon Blanc grapes, which was not then available in Canterbury.  Sauvignon 
Blanc grapes were essential to make New Zealand‟s flagship Sauvignon Blanc wine, a vital part 
of any exporter‟s offering.  Cellars of Marlborough, another cooperative company, was formed in 
1998 out of this attempt to gain traction on the opportunity gap from expanding the field of 
operation from the domestic New Zealand wine market to the world wine market.  Hence the 
acquisition of Marlborough vineyards for Sauvignon Blanc supply, which became Cellars of 
Marlborough.  However, over time extensive sales were not achieved and the cooperative 
structure could not stand the pressures of five entrepreneurs wanting to go in different individual 
strategic directions.  Management of those differences became too inefficient.  Eventually Cellars 
of Marlborough ceased trading in 2004.  The five founding parties made substantial capital gains 
from increased Marlborough viticultural land values (Gow, Oliver and Gow, 2002; Tipples, 
2008a).   
 
Cottesbrook Wine Company Limited 
From those ashes, like the proverbial phoenix, arose a partnership between two of the members, 
Brent Rawstron and Robin Mundy, who formed Cottesbrook Wines in 2002.  Cottesbrook Wines 
were to seize the opportunity gap of access to the international market place by specifically 
placing their wines with Tesco, the largest British supermarket chain (Davey, 2006), and one of 
the most successful exponents of customer relationship management (Humby, Hunt and Phillips, 
2007).  According to Stone (2005), Tesco has forged much of its marketing success on its 
customer orientation.  Part of that success was built on “…finding suppliers who share your 
vision and can deliver what you want quickly and cost effectively…”(Stone, 2005, p.2).  The two 
unequal companies fitted together well because they had similar marketing aims – keeping the 
customer happy and loyal (Turner and Wilson, 2006; Rawstron, 2006). 
 
The supply chain which resulted linked Cottesbrook Wines in a direct selling relationship with 
Tesco supermarkets through Thierry‟s Wine Services of Romsey, Hampshire (Tipples, 2006 and 
2008a).  The relationship from 2004 was successful and more wine, of different varieties, was 
successively exported to Tesco after the original bargain priced shipments of mid-priced quality 
Sauvignon Blanc.   However, the exclusive nature of the Tesco arrangement created a sense of 
insecurity and vulnerability in the Mundys, because “….all their eggs were in one basket”.  
Consequently setting up another vehicle for exporting their wine became a serious concern.  
Robin already had what he believed was a solution in his hands as a result of his previous 
experiences of different brands. 
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When a wine label was being considered for the Tesco venture Mundy had suggested „Flying 
Kiwi‟ as an idea, only to have it rejected by his partners and associates.  However, at the Romeo 
Bragato wine conference in Christchurch (2002) he had had a fortuitous meeting with a 
representative of Harkness Walker Design from Australia, who had already designed the very 
successful [yellow tail] label.  Business was slow and Robin was asked if he had ever had any 
ideas for labels, because Harkness‟ representative could develop an idea in his „idle‟ time at the 
conference.  „Flying Kiwi‟ was suggested, by means of an aeroplane or some such as the Kiwi is 
a flightless bird.  Three different Flying Kiwi designs were prepared aimed at the younger, thrill 
seeking, adventure market (ages 25-45) for whom there were no specific wines.  One showed the 
Flying Kiwi parapenting (Sauvignon Blanc), the second hand gliding (Chardonnay) and the third 
carriage by hot air balloon (Pinot Noir).  Further appeal to the „Green‟ and conservation lobbies 
was made by donating 1% of sales to the Kiwi Conservation Trust 
(www.nzconservationtrust.org.nz) at nearby Willowbank Wildlife Park for its Kiwi breeding 
programme.  When the design exercise was completed Harkness Walker Design attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to buy the design from St Helena Wine Estate.  Their own staff had voted it 
potentially more successful than [yellow tail].  They were advised it was not for sale but for 
exporting Kiwi wine!   
 
Subsequently „Flying Kiwi‟ was registered by St Helena as a trade mark in Australia, Japan, the 
USA, the UK, and all EU countries.  Much later another Flying Kiwi wine label was discovered, 
but fortunately that was only registered for New Zealand, while St Helena Wine Estate‟s Flying 
Kiwi Wine was only registered for overseas.  The word Kiwi was also registered by a French 
company, who had registered Kiwi Cuvée.  Initially they opposed European sales but when they 
wanted access to the USA, for which St Helena had registration, did a deal which allowed them 
access to the USA, while St Helena had access to Europe.   
 
Flying Kiwi Wine Company 
The Flying Kiwi Wine Company was established in 2006 by the Mundys to take advantage of this 
new brand.  The winemaker for the new company was Alan McCorkindale, who was also the 
consultant winemaker for Cottesbrook Wines.  Alan had an international reputation from over 20 
years international winemaking experience, including time in Australia, France (Burgundy, 
Alsace) and Germany.  During that time he won many awards and gold medals.  Alan has 
continued to promote Canterbury and Marlborough as fine wine producing areas and has said: 
“The Canterbury climate and the mix of grape varieties grown at St Helena have 
parallels with Northern Europe vineyards of Alsace and Burgundy, but with distinct 
regional Canterbury qualities”  (FortyFour Degrees, 2008) 
 
The record of the Flying Kiwi Wine Company is mixed.  With Alan McCorkindale as winemaker 
they already had the advantage of his status as a winemaker.  International marketing was not a 
simple exercise, but one full of hazards.  Some ventures have gone well and others not at all.  
Initial enthusiasm from two potential Japanese importers led to careful preparation of marketing 
materials translated into Japanese but did not yield any sales.  Dominique Vrigneau of Thierry‟s 
Wine Services, who had helped set up the relationship between Cottesbrook and Tesco, saw the 
label while visiting for Cottesbrook‟s sales to Tesco and wanted the chance to find UK agents.  
This was reluctantly accepted.  A conflict with their agency for Tesco was perceived as being 
possibly problematic.  Subsequently an article appeared in The Grocer (22 July 2006) 
announcing that Thierrys had added the Flying Kiwi brand, which had been especially developed 
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for the UK and US markets to its portfolio.  There were the three wines with Sauvignon Blanc 
and Chardonnay from Marlborough and a Canterbury Pinot Noir.  The former were for sale at 
£7.99 and the latter at £8.99, somewhat above the average price paid for a bottle of New Zealand 
wine at £5.97 and the overall retail average for the UK of £3.79 (Anon., 2006).  However, 
Thierrys could not deliver a single sales outlet for the UK as the Mundys wanted.  Further, the 
US distributor failed to pay for his wine and the deal was subject to an insurance claim – a 
precaution which St Helena Wine Estate had learnt from their very first export to British 
Airways, when their agent was put into liquidation and the costs of liquidation matched the value 
of the unsold stock involved. 
 
The most successful deals to date have been arranged with importers on the continent of Europe, 
particularly in the Netherlands, Germany and Scandinavian countries.  None of these have the 
same level of New Zealand competition as in the UK and USA as purchasers of New Zealand 
wine.  The major coup in Europe to date is an arrangement with FORTYFOUR DEGREES, 
which works as an agent alongside the Makro Group of 16 supermarkets.  In Germany their agent 
thought the Flying Kiwi idea was brilliant but the Aldi supermarket chain, interested in a 16,000 
case order, found it too trivial.  Consequently St Helena developed another label River Lane to 
keep the deal afloat, but it took two months of serious effort to find a mutually acceptable label 
which had not already been registered.  By shifting some of their focus from the UK to Northern 
Europe, Flying Kiwi are attempting to create new market space by meeting specific customer 
needs, something of a „blue sea‟ if not a „blue ocean‟. 
 
Issues of exchange rates 
Registration of brands has turned out to be a major issue, but one which is nevertheless critical to 
the financial success of a particular line.  Another has been the level of the New Zealand 
exchange rate.  For most of the life of St Helena Wine Estate this has not been a major issue, but 
the sustained strength of the New Zealand dollar in 2007 has caused unexpected problems for St 
Helena as well as other New Zealand wineries.  For example, over the period from mid 2006 to 
early 2008 the value of the NZ dollar against the pound has gone up from a low of approximately 
0.28 to 0.40.    Sales agreed in foreign currencies have been worth progressively less in New 
Zealand dollars when converted by St Helena, and they like many other New Zealand exporters 
have been progressively suffering.  Wineries have lacked the ability to take their business off-
shore as many exporting NZ manufacturers have done, being land based enterprises.   
 
This came to a head when the recently launched Tesco USA advised its suppliers of their 
intention to hold their prices for their retail customers, which was a consequence of the on-going 
inter-supermarket competition between Tesco and Walmart.  Thus suppliers had to absorb 
increasing costs of inputs, taxes and adverse exchange rates.  There were no exceptions for New 
Zealand exporters, who have to receive the same price in US dollars, which is worth substantially 
less in NZ dollars.  This strength has nothing to do with the intrinsic value of the NZ dollar but 
with the weakness of the US dollar and high internal New Zealand interest rates from fighting 
price inflation.  Cottesbrook had a supply contract for Tesco USA but gave it up as they refused 
to alter their prices for 12 months, when the $US was continuing to weaken against the $NZ and 
the market price of bulk wine in New Zealand was continuing to increase.  The latter increases 
had resulted from the increased price of grapes and juice in New Zealand after two years of 
smaller harvests from poor weather, particularly spring frosts.   
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Other Problems with Tesco 
The very positive relationship that Cottesbrook had enjoyed with Thierry‟s Wine Services and 
Tesco in the UK was undone in 2007 by internal changes of policy within Tesco, and were 
entirely outside of Cottesbrook‟s control.  In the middle of 2007 Tesco had a major brand review.  
A decision was taken to expand the New Zealand category substantially with wines at a higher 
price point.  However, this was not revealed to Cottesbrook or to Thierry‟s.  Unilaterally the 
Cottesbrook distribution was reduced from over 500 stores to about 60 and the Sauvignon Blanc 
Bag-in-Box programme (a previous Cottesbrook „blue ocean‟) was stopped without telling 
anybody (see Tipples, 2008a).  The decision was apparently based on Thierry‟s not making a 
proposal at the category review (Rawstron, 2008).  This failure may be explained by another 
complication, the accidental death of Thierry Cabanne (Thierry‟s, 2007).  Then both Thierry‟s 
and Cottesbrook approached Jason Godley, the director of Tesco in charge of wine.  A good 
relationship had been established with him when he had visited New Zealand and was entertained 
by Cottesbrook.  As a consequence Cottesbrook remained in Tesco, but with a much reduced 
presence until the next category review.  Subsequently Thierry‟s have worked hard to restore the 
relationship with Cottesbrook, demonstrating how seriously they want to get the relationship with 
Tesco going again.  Brent Rawstron observed that he had never seen such behaviour by a UK 
agent before (Rawstron, 2008). 
 
Au revoir, Cottesbrook 
However, all was not well at Cottesbrook and a strategic review became necessary.  Robin 
Mundy had lost his confidence in working with Thierry‟s and Tesco.  Volumes of wine traded 
were going to be reduced.  Mundy and Rawstron were confronted by different problems too.  
Mundy had sold his 20 hectare block of Sauvignon Blanc vines in Marlborough, when he had 
been made a very good offer in 2006.  Then he obtained his supplies of Sauvignon Blanc from 
contract growers.  Rawstron had kept his Marlborough vineyards and thus had his own supply of 
Sauvignon Blanc grapes.  Consequently Rawstron was prepared to subsidize his previous 
marketing investments from his vineyard operations, while Mundy and St Helena had to pay the 
going contract rate for their grape supplies and thus were caught by the fixed supermarket selling 
price and rising exchange rate problem.  Further, it became apparent that there was a performance 
gap with the Cottesbrook office and administrator.  Both enterprises, St Helena and Cottesbrook, 
were already making all the arrangements necessary for making wine and marketing it.  Why was 
the other office necessary?  So the decision was made to save the $50,000 it was costing and put 
the work back into the respective company offices.  It was also decided to divide the Cottesbrook 
enterprise, with Robin Mundy taking the Conway Hills and Fauna brands and Brent Rawstron 
retaining the Cottesbrook brand worldwide.  The relationship with Thierry‟s and Tesco is set to 
continue and will hopefully increase again following a March 2008 category review, but with no 
Mundy input 
 
Giving up the need to supply Tesco, when grapes have been in short supply, has had the 
advantage of making supply of other contracts easier.  It also goes to show that the Mundys were 
right to be concerned about total dependence on Tesco.  However, it has also meant not pushing 
Flying Kiwi Wines too hard until supplies are more readily available.  In 2008 at least 550 tones 
of grapes have been crushed and the short term supply problems seem to be over.  St Helena has 
now found another UK agent (Myliko Wines of Manchester) to replace Thierry‟s Wine Services.  
They plan to continue to develop a relationship with another UK multiple; to continue to make 
inroads into Europe, particularly Scandinavia; and to grow their markets overall in preparation 
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for the huge amount of New Zealand wine coming „on-stream‟ from the extensive plantings 
which have already taken place.  The expanded vineyard area will create special problems when 
all districts enjoy good harvests, but there should be no shortage of grapes available „on contract‟ 
for St Helena (Mundy, 2008; Hayes, 2008). 
 
Lessons from the case of St Helena Wine Estate 1978-2008 
St Helena Wine Estate started as a wine business producing some 15,000-20,000 cases (12 bottle 
cases, or 135,000-180,000 litres) of wine per year in the early 1980s, when seasonal variations 
are taken into consideration.  It is now marketing 115-120,000 cases (1,035,000-1,080,000 litres) 
per year, or a sevenfold increase in production.  That is a significant achievement starting from a 
zero base in 1978, with no previous wine experience or family tradition, unlike many of their 
New World competitors such as Casella Wines, or „new‟ Old World competitors like Jean-
Claude Mas, the originator of the Arrogant Frog label for his Languedoc Vin de Pays wines 
(Tipples, 2008b).   
 
Initial marketing experiences in New Zealand were frustrated because of difficulties of 
maintaining supplies to vendors, and when breakthroughs were achieved in exporting there were 
bad experiences with the commercial reliability of agents or those importing St Helena wines.  
Important lessons were learnt from both types of experiences, which have benefited St Helena 
and its subsidiaries in subsequent years. 
 
The critical developments in exporting were started with the Cellars of Canterbury initiative, 
which eventually resulted in Cottesbrook Wines and the initially expanding and profitable 
relationship with Tesco plc.  That created a blue ocean particularly where it involved the creation 
of the first successful Bag in a Box (BiB) of New Zealand Sauvignon Blanc on the UK market.  
From that relationship five initial lessons were drawn (Tipples, 2008a).  First, Cottesbrook had 
seized a huge opportunity with Tesco, but one with considerable risks attached.  Opportunities 
have to be grasped in spite of some risk.  Secondly, they had concentrated on providing exactly 
what Tesco wanted, exactly labelled and packaged to Tesco requirements.  Thirdly, they had 
monitored the supply situation to Tesco closely to ensure their wine was always on Tesco 
shelves, whether Tesco believed they needed them or not.  Fourthly, they showed exemplary 
attention to detail throughout the supply chain, building relationships at all levels.  Finally, the 
study confirmed the centrality of the channel coordinators to the success of the venture.  To these 
can be added the wisdom of not keeping all their eggs in one basket if that relationship should 
fail, as it eventually did – both because of a change of buying policy by Tesco and because of the 
greater imperatives of Tesco plc‟s international corporate competition policies and the vagaries of 
international exchange rates, together with the New Zealand government‟s concerns with 
domestic inflation. 
 
Entry to and exit from commercial relationships have been highlighted as features of supply 
chain life from New Zealand to worldwide markets.  When the Tesco relationship ended for St 
Helena, measures to diversify into the Flying Kiwi wine brand was already well advanced as St 
Helena sought to establish another „blue ocean‟.  The story behind the Flying Kiwi was not only 
to promote the brand but also show the „green credentials‟ of the Winery, with the donations 
made to the New Zealand Conservation Trust for the conservation of native Kiwis.  Setting up 
that brand was facilitated by the serendipitous encounter with Harkness Walker Design, who 
helped with the preparation of the new brand labels and logos.  That supplemented further the 
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experiences with design obtained in the Cottesbrook/Tesco relationship.  Then that was taken 
further with the redesign of the brand to meet the needs of the German Aldi supermarket chain, 
with the River Lane label.  All the wine sent from New Zealand was block stacked in the 
container, for easy packaging in the custom made Aldi sales modules for ease of display, efficient 
use of floor space, ready handling, and minimum waste disposal issues.  A good wine brand has 
been said to need an authentic story – helping the Kiwi to „fly‟ or survive; distinctiveness, as in 
the three Flying Kiwis; quality for the medium price point set for the wines; and consistency in 
all aspects of the brand (Curlewis, 2007).  Flying Kiwi has been designed to achieve these 
factors. 
 
Robin Mundy, at age 61, with another generation to succeed him (a son involved in Marlborough 
wine research) is still challenged by the new problems that a wine producer encounters each day.  
He has continued to be a successful channel coordinator, working especially closely with both his 
travelling international sales agent and problem/dispute handler, Graeme Thompson and  
Alan McCorkindale, his consultant winemaker.  Further he has always been ready to buy in the 
skills needed to make his businesses succeed, from Danny Schuster originally to McCorkindale 
most recently.  Yet he remains in touch with the different parts of his various supply chains 
through continued involvement in marketing promotions in different worldwide locations, 
profiling both St Helena‟s different wine labels and New Zealand. 
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